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BOUNDARIES-CONFLICT BETWEEN COURSES AND DISTANCES
A number of interesting problems in the construction of deeds are presented
where the description of property is by metes and bounds and the descriptive
elements are conflicting.' Certain rules of construction have been developed.
These rules have been summarized by Tifiany,2 and for our purpose may be
stated as follows:
1. Fixed and known monuments prevail over courses, distances, and
contents.
2. When the courses and distances conflict, neither is preferred but the
whole description is considered to determine which conforms to the in-
tention of the parties.
3. Description by metes and bounds prevails over general description.
4. Area is the weakest indication of intent.
The second of these rules has presented some difficulty. If the rules are
rigidly followed, what is the outcome when courses and distances conflict and
there is no data by which to determine which was intended to control?
The courts generally seem to favor course over distance in such a case. One
of the leading authorities for this result is Ewart v. Squtre,' where the court, in
listing the "guides" in order of importance, placed course over distance. The
court said: "But the rule is flexible, and it does not control against the intention
of the parties as shown by the description taken as a whole."' One of the few
rationalizations for this preference is given in Colvn v. Fell, where the court said:
"But the presumption would spm to be rather in favor of the course than of
the distance, as chain men are more liable to inaccuracy in measurement than
the surveyor in the course."' The only other rationalization found by this writer,
if it may be called that, is the statement in Beckley v. Bryan and Ransdale that
. reason as well as law seems to suggest that the distances, taken in our
mode of mensuration, ought to yield, as being much the most uncertain of the
two."7 Though not stated categoncally, another reason over and above the pref-
erence for the work of the surveyor over that of chain men, probably in the
purview of the court, is the difficulty in exactly measuring distances over terrain
IStates vary in their concern with this problem, as descriptions in the majority
of deeds in some states are by references to plat or U.S. Land Survey. In Kentuck).
however, a very great proportion of the descriptions in deeds are by metes :iod
bounds. Cases are innumerable where the lines have run, from time immemorial.
"South 154 poles to a poplar tree, Fast 74 poles to an oak," etc., and where poplar
and oak have long since disappeared.
IFor a more complete statement of such rules, see TIFFANY A TREATISI" ON T[riii
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Sec. 673 (Abridged ed. 1940).
:'See 7 Fifth Dec. Digest, Boundaries 3 (5).
1239 Fed. 34 (1916). Accord: U.S. v. State Investment Co., 261 U.S. 206, 68 L. 1-d.
639, 44 Sup. Ct. 289 (1923): Tice v. Winchester, 225 N. C. 673, 36 S.E. 2d 257 (1945).
'239 Fed. 34, 36 (1916).
40 111. 418, 425 (1866).
'Sneed 91, 93 (Ky. 1801).
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which is not level in comparison to the simplicity of sighting a course by com-
pass. There is also an indication that courts believe some surveyors are lax, in
that they locate three corners, sight courses from the first and third corners, and
estimate the distance of the two lines to their intersection.
Probably the first case where the Kentucky Court of Appeals was faced
with this problem was that of Beckley v. Bryan and Ransdale.' The court in
that case preferred course over distance, there being an absence of any circum-
stance which would indicate wluch was in error. This was subsequently followed
as a general proposition. ' Shortly thereafter the court began to find "exceptions"
to the rule. It found so many that it was subsequently said of the general rule
that "it has been departed from about as frequently as it has been followed.""0
This statement, however, is not true m a numerical sense, even with a liberal con-
struction of the word "exception" It is believed that there are few exceptions
to the rule, when properly applied; and that what have been frequently spoken
of as exceptions are, in most instances, fact situations where the need for the
rule does not anse.
First, it may help to place the rule in its proper setting, as established by
cases decided by the authorities. "The intention of the parties, as inferred from
the terms and descriptions controls, and any rules concerning the relative im-
portance of the various elements of the description are merely aids in arriving
at this intention."'" Natural and permanent objects are the most satisfactory
evidence of this intention and control all other means of description." Artificial
marks are next in importance in determining the intent of the parties." This is
followed by courses and distances." Last of all comes area." Where courses
and distances, when followed, do not close the survey-i.e., where there is error
in one-in the absence of any facts indicating where the error lies, the courses
nmust be run, lengthening or shortening the distance, as each case may require,
and in proportion to the length of each lost line, to close the survey. If the survey
cannot be made to close by this means, then,-and not otherwise, a deviation from
the courses called for must also aid in accomplishing the purpose."
Ibid.
Bryan v. Beckley, Litt. Sel. Cas. 91 (Ky. 1809); Pearson v. Baker, 4 Dana 321
(Ky. 1836): Kerr v. DeLaney, 28 Ky. L. Rep. 1140, 91 S.W 286 (1906); Chambers V.
Thorp, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 271, 93 S.W. 627 (1906); Morgan v. Renfro, 124 Ky. 314, 99
S.W 311 (1907): Brashears v. Joseph, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1139, 108 S.W 307 (1908)'
Combs v. Valentine, 144 Ky. 184, 137 S.W. 1080 (1911); Rock Creek Property Co. v.
Hill. 162 Ky. 324, 172 S.V 671 (1915); Fidelity Reality Co. v. Flahaven Land Co.,
193 Ky. 355, 236 S.W 260 (1922); Fordson Coal Co. v. Spurlock, 19 F. 2d 820 (1927);
Louisville Cooperage Co. v. Collins, 228 Ky. 266, 14 SA.. 2d 1090 (1929); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, 273 Ky. 563, 117 S.W 2d 180 (1937).
Contra: The Poplar Mountain Coal Co. v. Dick, 7 Ky. Opin. 420, 424 (1874),
where it was aid: "But there is no reason why the courses should prevail over the
distances called for. The distances called for limit the extent of the line, unless it
he etenled to reach a natural object called for." This case was not subsequently
followed, as the next three cases in point reverted to the general rule.
" Cornett v. Kentucky River Coal Co., 175 Ky. 718, 727, 195 S.W 149, 153 (1917).
"IiF:FAN'I A TRIATISI. ON Tm MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Sec. 673
(Abridged ed. 1940).
"See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, 273 Ky. 563. 117 S.W 2d 180 (1937).
1 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
" Ibid.
"See Morgan v. Renfro, 121 Ky. 314, 99 S.W 311 (1907).
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The cases which purport to raise exceptions must be considered against this
background. Preston s Heirs v. Bowmar" is a case frequently cited as an excep-
tion. The Kentucky Court of Appeals there held that the mode of closing the
survey which operates most unfavorably to the party claiming under it must be
adopted. This resulted in a ruling favoring distance over course. On appeal,"
however, the U. S. Supreme Court treated this case as one in which the intention
of the parties could be determined upon a minute examination of the circum-
stances. This alleviated the necessity of applying the rule.
Another situation is found in Calvert v. Fitzgerald,1" where, if the courses
were followed, the distance would have been far extended. This might be con-
sidered as a circumstance indicating intention, but it would probably be better
to regard this as a true exception. It does not detract from the rule, but makes
it certain that injustice will be avoided in a strict application of the rule, where
both are considered together in a determination of the case.
Several cases are cited as exceptions to the rule which state that the rule
will not be followed where it appears from the facts (or circumstances, or plat
and certificate of survey) that the course is mistaken.' This can hardly be re-
garded as an exception. The rule arises only when the intention of the parties
cannot be ascertained from the circumstances of the case.
Another case, said to be an exception to the rule, holds that the course must
yield where it is evident from the calls of the deed that distance is the material
and controlling factor.' Stated thus, this would seem to be another situation in
which the rule does not apply. But this brings to mind the possibility of cases
involving small plats of land in urban areas. Though the circumstances might
not indicate that the distances are the material and controlling factor, on such
small plots they would almost necessarily be so. To avoid the advent of a
borderline case in this direction, it might be wiser to consider this an exception,
to be kept under the surveillance of She general rule.
One case purported to summarize the exceptions to the general rule." The
only doctrine there discussed, with which we have not yet dealt, is that course
should yield to distance where by following the course a figure is produced that
does not correspond with the original survey and plat upon which the patent is
issued. It would seem the best course not to refer to this as an exception. The
original survey and plat may always be considered as evidence tending to show
that there is a mistake in the course, which would alleviate the necessity of
applying this rule. If it does not show such a mistake, then the rule should be
followed, there being insufficient proof that the land conveyed was to be the
same as such original survey and plat.
There remains to be considered the opimon of the court in Farmers' National
Bank of Somerset v. Bolton.' In giving directions to the lower court as to the
112 Bibb, 493 (Ky. 1811).
's 6 Wheat 580, (U.S. 1821).
"Litt. Sel. Cas. 388 (Ky. 1912).
- Steele's Heirs v. Taylor, 3 A. K. Marsh. 225 (Ky. 1821)" Croghani s Lessee \.
Nelson, 44 U.S. 187 11 L. Ed: 554 (1845); May v. Wolf Valley Coal Co., 167 KN. 525,
180 S.W. 781 (1915).
21 Blight v. Atwvell, 4 J. J. Mar. 278 (1830).
'Supra, note 10.
1265 Ky. 586, 97 SW 2d 406 (1956).
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correct instructions to the jury, the following statement was made: "The court
will also instruct the jury that courses and distances must yield to natural objects
proven and established by the evidence, and where courses and distances are
not in harmony, courses must yield to distances." (Italics authors) In support
of this statement, the court cited two cases. The first of these, Ltndsay v.
Latham,' contains merely a statement of the rule of construction that courses
and distances must yield to natural objects when there is a conflict. The second
case cited, Louisville Cooperage Co. v. Collins,' which evidently was cited to
support the latter part of his model instruction, also involves a model instruction
as to courses and distances in the case of conflict: " 'The court instructs the jury
that in the absence of any facts tending to a contrary conclusion distance yields
to course, and the distances must be shortened or extended in proportion to the
length of each line as the case may require, to make the survey close ....
In view of the entire absence of rationalization in the Bolton case, the opimon
there must be regarded as a mistake.
It is submitted that only two exceptions can be made to the rule where the
fact situation appears to be such that it would otherwise apply-
(1) The rule should not be applied if its application would result in the
distances being greatly extended or contracted.
(2) The rule should not be applied where it appears that distance is the
material and controlling object, and courses are merely an adjunct to
complete the description.
When thus applied, the rule retains its value in construing conveyances
where it appears that the boundaries must be fixed according to the metes and
bounds, and the courses and distances, when run, do not close the survey, and
there are no circumstances showing which should be preferred. The reasons for
this preference are sound, and there are no reasons which would support a con-
trary rile. The application of the rule avoids an attempt to secure a decision
based on the sympathy of the court rather than on sound law. It gives certainty
where there is none without it. Although it fills only a small place in the law
of conveyancing, it fills a definite need which is shown by the considerable num-
ber of cases raising this point.
D)ELBERT L. McLAVGHLIN
32 Ky. L. Rep. 867, 107 S.W 267 (1908).
228 Ky. 266, 14 S.W 2d 1090 (1929).
Id, at 270, II SW 2( at 1092.
